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COUNTER-THEOLOGY 
 
‘To take the ethnographic route is to step off a narrow path in which 
alternatives to our own phrasings of reality are simply meaningless or 
merely poetic.’ (Gay y Blasco & Wardle 2007: 197) 
 
 The final sentence of How to Read Ethnography compels the reader to accept a 
mandate. Either, you walk the ‘ethnographic route’ or you take the narrow path of 
meaninglessness or waxy poeticism. Ethnography, the authors argue, ‘transforms 
everyday relations into social relations,’ where in order to get ‘as close as possible to the 
way in which the people concerned themselves live it,’ we must build upon 
ethnographic knowledge that is ‘established through the creation of levels of analysis 
which are the product of these processes of filtering and organizing’ (2007: 70). By using 
‘ethnographic concepts’ (108), we approach ‘ethnographic concerns’ (3) through 
‘ethnographic writing’ (19) to achieve ‘ethnographic knowledge’ (70). This knowledge is 
‘the heart of ethnographic enterprise’ (64), and it is by learning this knowledge encoded 
in ‘concerns and techniques [that] play out in specific texts that you will learn how to 
read ethnography’ (2). 
 Indeed, if that were all that ethnography consisted of, there would be little 
debate as to what ethnography was in the first place (see, of course, Clifford & Marcus 
1986). The gravitational centrality of ethnography gleaned from this definition, with its 
lowest common denominator of ethnographic knowledge, is dangerous to assume, as it 
immediately reduces any and all ethnographic texts to a single line of theological 
meaning: ‘the “message” of the Author-God’ (Barthes 1977: 146). This operation 
imposes ‘a stop clause’ which, seals the texts with a ‘final signification, to close the 
writing’ (Barthes 1977: 147). In doing so, the authors’ intentions are ‘found out,’ 
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whereby ‘the text is ‘explained;’ the critic has conquered’ (147). This act of subjugation 
is how any foundationalist, universalised definition of ethnography – like the one 
presented here – functions. 
 Without the author, every text dissolves into a plurality of meanings, situated in 
conflicting dimensions and supported neither by stable deductive support nor 
primordial building blocks. As Barthes argues, 
 
In a multiple writing, indeed, everything is to be distinguished, but 
nothing deciphered; structure can be followed, “threaded” (like a 
stocking that has run) in all its recurrences and all its stages, but there is 
no underlying ground; the space of the writing is to be traversed, not 
penetrated […] (1977: 147) 
 
Like a stocking that has run, the text can be travelled, but not represented – not 
signified with final meaning. As Tyler has argued, ‘the whole point of “evoking” rather 
than “representing” is that it frees ethnography from mimesis and the inappropriate 
mode of scientific rhetoric’ (1986: 136). This rhetoric entails exactly the kind of 
‘underlying’ typologies present in How to Read Ethnography: ‘facts,’ (191), ‘knowledge’ 
(70), ‘evidence’ (105), ‘material’ (69), ‘currency’ (105), and (worst of all), ‘ethnography 
as true knowledge’ (195). These and all similar concepts, ‘except as empty invocations, 
have no parallels either in the experience of ethnographic fieldwork or in the writing of 
ethnographies’ (Tyler 1986: 136). 
 Thus, in a move that is ‘counter-theological’ (Barthes 1977: 147) I here abandon 
debate of classifying signs (this is ‘ethnography’) and signifying classes (ethnography is 
‘x, y, z’) – nostalgic of Sisyphean incessancy – to ask a much more valuable (and feasible) 
question: ‘how do we read ethnography?’ ‘[T]o refute God and his hypostases, reason, 
science, the law’ (Barthes 1977: 147), I ask this to place the burden of proof not upon 
some final signification, but upon the experience of the reader. The reader, always 
already taking-in text, is the source of integration; she is ‘the very space in which are 
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inscribed, without any being lost, all the citations a writing consists of, the unity of a text 
is not its origin, it is in its destination’ (Barthes 1977: 6). 
  
ETHNOGRAPHY AS PROCLIVITY 
 To answer how we read ethnography, we need to understand our expectations 
of ethnography as readers and, more importantly, we need to understand what informs 
those expectations in the first place. For the reader, it is merely our convictions that set 
up those expectations (not ‘facts’ or ‘truths;’ merely belief): convictions driven by the 
persuasive power of a textual object. Ethnography seems peculiar in this regard, as 
Geertz reminds us that 
 
so much of it consists in incorrigible assertion. The highly situated nature 
of ethnographic description – this ethnographer, in this time, in this 
place, with these informants, these commitments, and these 
experiences, a representative of a particular culture, a member of a 
certain class – gives to the bulk of what is said a rather take-it-or-leave-it 
quality. (1988: 5) 
 
I don’t know anything about the Nuer. I’ve never seen a Nuer, I’ve never been to 
South Sudan or western Ethiopia, and even if I go to these places, I will probably never 
see a Nuer. But what makes me (indeed, any reader who hasn’t been in the author’s 
shoes) believe Evans-Pritchards’ account of them in The Nuer? It surely isn’t fact. There’s 
nothing I can point to in the text and say, ‘that is true’ or ‘that is false.’ I have neither 
the empirical information to prove ‘true’ his observations nor the deductive capabilities 
to confirm his trails of argument. Thus I again ask – ‘how do we read this?’ What textual 
strategies present in ethnographic texts make us believe that what we are reading is 
ethnography? The answer lies in the rhetoric used. 
 As readers, all we have to go on is rhetoric. We read ethnography not as a set of 
facts, or truths, or theological meanings, as there is no basis for these ‘empty 
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invocations’ (Tyler 1986: 136). We read, and contend we are reading, ethnography 
based solely on the persuasiveness of a certain kind of textual organisation: 
‘ethnography’ is a proclivity – an inclination – toward a specific type of textual 
organisation informed by ‘rhetorical accomplishment’ (Geertz 1988: 26). I contend that 
this specific textual organisation is based upon the combination and juxtaposition of 
different authorial registers within a text that persuades the reader to believe that what 
they are reading is, indeed, ethnography. This is because multiple authorial registers 
construct a mutually supporting textual interface of conflicting voices that produces a 
convincingness of ‘this is ethnography’ for the reader, on account of the all-too-human 
experience of fieldwork and write-up that are incapable of being reduced to one vocal 
register. 
 Geertz continues that, ‘“Being There” authorially, palpably on the page, is in any 
case as difficult a trick to bring off as “being there” personally’ (1988: 24). The exacting 
requirements of reproducing so many dimensions of one’s “being there” personally, 
from the friendships, fears, joys, triumphs, and disappointments of the field, to the 
smell of food cooking, palpable condensation in the air, sounds of a friend singing, and 
the prick-prack of rain falling on a tin roof; even feelings of one’s ‘willingness to endure 
a certain amount of loneliness, invasion of privacy, and physical discomfort’ or one’s 
‘relaxed way with odd growths and unexplained fevers’ (1988: 24) – not to mention the 
scribbles, notes, recordings, transcriptions, videos, word documents, spell-checks, 
emailed drafts, edits, and frustrations of losing data – all in total require the 
‘Olympianism of the unauthorial physicist and the sovereign consciousness of the 
hyperauthorial novelist’ (1988: 10). 
 These epic proportions of coding all aspects of one’s life-experience into text 
demand a certain complex type of textual organisation. It demands a certain kind of 
rhetorical alacrity and compositional gusto to achieve just this type: one of multivocal 
competition and conflict, as different registers of voice convey different types of 
information, with different intentions and contradictory means of conveyance.  
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AUTHOR-FUNCTION 
 These tactics move the reader to take a book’s-worth of ‘incorrigible assertion’ 
(Geertz 1988: 5) as believable. But why? In the process of reading, we become 
disoriented by competing authorial registers, and we force ourselves to tune to the 
frequency of one, united voice. This is the voice of ‘the author,’ here asserting ‘a 
classificatory function’ that ‘permits one to group together a certain number of texts’ (in 
this case a certain number of registers within a text) in a way that ‘serves to characterize 
a certain mode of being of discourse’ (Foucault 1991: 107). In reading, we collapse 
Barthes’ ‘multiple writing’ to a coherent singularity (1977: 147). We ‘hear’ the voice of 
‘Evans-Pritchard.’ The author-function operates here, Foucault argues, as ‘the principle 
of a certain unity of writing […] a point where contradictions are resolved’ (1991: 111). 
By resolving the logically inconclusive, we, as readers, exercise the author-function to 
make imaginative leaps around the different authorial registers, which reifies the notion 
that the text is really ‘something of a fiction’ (Geertz, in Olson 1991).  
 
THESIS 
 With fiction in mind, I again rephrase the question of analysis, from ‘how do we 
read ethnography?’ to ‘how do we read the novel?’ In doing so, we find that we read the 
novel the same way we read ethnography. We find the stuff of all works of fiction is the 
same stuff of all works of ethnography: bundles of ‘incorrigible assertion’ (Geertz 1988: 
5) spun from several different authorial registers, all wound tightly back to the author-
function where ‘incompatible elements are at last tied together or organized around a 
fundamental or originating contradiction’ (Foucault 1991: 111) – all coordinated by the 
reader in the temporality of reading. 
 Thus, in the act of reading, ethnography and the novel are both proclivities 
towards a specific type of textual organisation that is achieved through ‘rhetorical 
accomplishment.’ In this sense, the novel is ethnography because it can be read as 
ethnography, and vice-versa: each composed of authorial registers writing only 
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assertions; each compelling the reader to weave both registers and assertions into the 
voice of one author. 
 
REGISTERS 
 Below I demonstrate this theory of persuasion through analysing strategic 
deployment of these registers in one ethnography: Claude Lévi-Strauss‘s Tristes 
Tropiques, and one novel: Kurt Vonnegut’s Cat’s Cradle. Each of these texts engages 
with four similar distinct registers, which fit to Geertz’s thematic analysis of Tristes 
Tropiques (1988: 35-39) that I reproduce here: 
 
(a). Travel Book 
(b). Ethnography 
(c). Philosophical Treatise 
(d). Reformist Critique 
 
 
(a). TRAVEL BOOK 
i. ADVENTURE 
 The first register conveys a thrilling sense of ‘the adventure’ with temporality 
established from the outset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But, on that evening of the Franco-
American dinner, neither my colleagues 
nor I … had any idea of the role which 
we were to play, however involuntarily, 
in the evolution of Brazilian society. […] 
George Dumas had just warned us that 
we must be prepared to lead the same 
life as our new masters: the life, that is 
to say, of Automobile Club, casino, and 
race-course. […] ‘Above all,’ Dumas had 
said, ‘you must be well dressed.’ (Lévi-
Strauss 21-22) 
Listen: 
When I was a younger man – two wives 
ago, 250,000 cigarettes ago, 3,000 
quarts of booze ago… 
When I was a much younger man, I 
began to collect material for a book 
called The Day the World Ended. 
The book was to be factual. […] 
It was to be a Christian book. I was a 
Christian then. 
I am a Bokonist now.  
(Vonnegut 1-2) 
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We are enveloped with reminiscence that, from the beginning of each text, 
incites us to prepare for the scale of the journey ahead. Lévi-Strauss teases us with the 
sheer gravity of his role to play in Brazilian society, and we are taunted by Dumas’s 
promises of luxury and upper class lifestyle. Jonah (the first-person narrator of 
Vonnegut) takes a sardonic approach, using abrasive material means to measure his 
journey. Instead of taunting, he grabs us with the command to listen, and with his quick 
move from Christian to Bokonist, we are led on wanting to know what events prompt 
this dramatic conversion. 
 These passages give away the register we’re dealing with because of how the 
authors scale themselves temporally to look back on square one as wiser, worldlier, and 
changed men. We are made aware of the durational character of what is to come, and 
we are further made aware of the change to anticipate in the author himself. This 
author is not a static, objective, foreign observer. He will inhabit, travel, walk, drive, 
drink, smoke, marry, divorce, and dress sharply. The presence of the author is 
established as immediate and integral to dimensions of the text-to-come, as an ageing 
traveller. 
 
ii. SUBJUGATION 
 Further, this register expresses the feeling of subjugation that each author has, 
pitted against myriad forces of his travels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Fort de France I had been treated as a 
Jew and a Freemason in the pay of the 
Americans. Here, in Porto Rico, I was 
taken for an emissary of Vichy – if not, 
indeed, of the Germans. […] the F.B.I. 
was asked to send a French-speaking 
specialist to examine my papers. (I 
trembled to think how long it would 
take to find a specialist who could 
decipher my notes, since these mostly 
related to the almost entirely unknown 
dialects of central Brazil. (Lévi-Strauss 
36) 
In the customs shed at Monzano Airport, 
we were all required to submit to a 
luggage inspection, and to convert what 
money we intended to spend in San 
Lorenzo into local currency, into 
Corporals, which “Papa” Monzano 
insisted were fifty American cents. The 
shed was neat and new, but plenty of 
signs had already been slapped on the 
walls higgledy-piggledy. ANYBODY 
CAUGHT PRACTICING BOKONISM IN SAN 
LORENZO, said one, WILL DIE ON THE 
HOOK! (Vonnegut 134) 
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The authors are momentarily helpless. Facing greater authority than themselves, 
they are subjected to detention and currency conversion. Threatened by foreign 
suspicion, both implicit and explicit, they are warned to mind local customs and local 
powers. Further, each is deeply entangled in a web of cross-border, trans-continental 
political-economic relationships. Lévi-Strauss is premised of being an enemy emissary, 
and Jonah is caught between currency rates, waiting to pass baggage check while 
contemplating death-by-hook in San Lorenzo’s customs shed. 
 These selections call us to the awareness of the author as the subjective centre 
of a globe-spanning set of relationships. We are made intimately aware of their self-
consciousness as characters present in a moving, shifting, migrating world economy 
where their well-being is fundamentally inconsequential. And in all of this, they are just 
as much frustrated and perplexed by myriad international interests, local laws and legal 
customs as we are in our own travels. This register establishes the personal immediacy 
of the authors, by accentuating their corporeality, ethnicity, nationality, and their 
ultimate (and inevitable) subjugation to forces beyond their control. 
 
(b). ETHNOGRAPHY 
i. RELIGION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The second register considerably conflicts with the first. We are presented with 
the author’s authoritative command of cultural concepts, related to religious beliefs. 
The lay-out of the [Bororo] village does 
not only allow full and delicate play to 
the institutional system; it summarizes 
and provides a basis for the relationship 
between Man and the Universe, 
between Society and the Supernatural, 
and between the living and the dead. 
[…] A man is not, for them, an individual, 
but a person. He is part of a sociological 
universe: the village which exists for all 
eternity […] (Lévi-Strauss 216-218) 
[Jonah reciting The Books of Bokonon] 
In the beginning, God created the earth, 
and he looked upon it in His cosmic 
loneliness. And God said, “Let Us make 
living creatures out of mud, so the mud 
can see what We have done.” […] Man 
blinked. “What is the purpose of all 
this?” he asked politely. “Everything 
must have a purpose?” asked God. 
“Certainly,” said man. “Then I leave it to 
you to think of one for all this,” said 
God. And He went away. (Vonnegut 265) 
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These selections portray the authors actively claiming knowledge over religious beliefs. 
Each claims beliefs as something they command and exploit: beliefs in the Bororo village 
system and its corresponding sociological organisation for Lévi-Strauss, and beliefs in 
the creation of the world and the ramifications, as recounted through The Books of 
Bokonon by Jonah. 
 At the crossroads of Man and the Universe, these quotes move us away from the 
world-whisking adventures of explorers to provide a different register of stationary, 
objective, externalised, categorical knowledge. In the form of structural logic and formal 
organisational links for one, and in narrative and archival data for the other, they 
equally lay claim to knowing something about the people that they describe, and 
somehow representing their beliefs. This act of representation is a conventional 
ethnographic skill: to ‘capture’ knowledge (of structure, function, narrative) that is a 
kind of recitation. Reciting the dichotomies in Bororo village life, ‘Man and the 
Universe,’ ‘Society and the Supernatural,’ and ‘the living and the dead,’ and reciting the 
textual account of God’s creation of the world – both authors read and recount the 
anthropological information before them. They are attuned to such knowledge in their 
command of traditional ethnographic data, but most importantly, the authors are both 
indefinitely consigned to a register of expressionless objectivism and external 
observation. 
 
ii. RITUAL 
 These observations are further evidenced in the following passages, concerning 
ritual. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But twice a day – at eleven-thirty in the 
morning and seven in the evening – 
there was a general assembly 
underneath the pergola which ran round 
their house. The ritual in question was 
that of the chimarrao: mate drunk 
through a tube. The mate is a tree of the 
same family as our ilex; and its foliage, 
lightly roasted over the smoke of an 
underground fire, is pounded into a 
course powder, the colour of reseda, 
which keeps for a long time in kegs. 
(Lévi-Strauss 147) 
“Gott mate mutt,” crooned Dr. von 
Koenigswald. 
“Dyot meet mat,” echoed “Papa” 
Monzano. 
“God made mud,” was what they’d said, 
each in his own dialect. I will here 
abandon the dialects of the litany. 
“God got lonesome” said Von […] 
“God got lonesome.” 
“So God said to some of the mud, ‘Sit 
up!’” 
“So God said to some of the mud, ‘Sit 
up!’” (Vonnegut 220) 
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These passages are claims to specific religious processes. The detailed itinerary 
of the mate ritual and the hypnotic rhetoric of Jonah’s ritual experience, ‘Dyot meet 
mat,’ affix fluid activities to conceptual structures in attempts rationalise what is really 
going on. 
 This kind of representation, again, is exemplary of traditional ethnographic 
technique. But, these passages go farther by putting us in the action. These are not 
merely descriptions; they are narrative passages describing events that the author 
experienced (so we are led to believe). The use of specific times, specific preparation 
methodologies, specific colour and textural information for Lévi-Strauss and of direct 
dialects, repetition, verbal rhythm, and religious litany for Jonah place this authorial 
register in a position of external validity – a casting of judgment through assessment. 
Crucially, in order to do this, the authors are committed to the margins of their ritual 
environments: static and immobile in order to capture the ‘essence’ of each experience. 
 
(c). PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISE 
i. PROGRESS 
 The third authorial register present in both texts is, yet again, of a different 
constitution. Neither engaging the material worldliness of the author in the travel book, 
nor representing the activity of specific individuals, this register sits high with a flair of 
buoyant intellectualism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the myth-minded age, Man was no 
more free than he is today; but it was 
his humanness alone which kept him 
enslaved. As he had only a very 
restricted role over Nature, he was 
protected, and to a certain degree 
emancipated, by the protective cushion 
of his dreams. As and when these 
dreams turned into knowledge, so did 
Man’s power increase: they gave us, if I 
may so put it, the ‘upper hand’ over the 
universe, and we still take an immense 
pride in it. (Lévi-Strauss 390) 
“The people of San Lorenzo,” the father 
[Castle] told me, “are interested in only 
three things: fishing, fornication, and 
Bokonism.” 
“Don’t you think they are interested in 
progress?” 
“They’ve seen some of it. There’s only 
one aspect of progress that really excites 
them.” 
“What’s that?” 
“The electric guitar.” 
(Vonnegut 234) 
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Here, philosophical discussions provide us a register that is pensive, concerned, 
distressed, but above all interested in problems and trends as applied to groups of 
people. These are not ethnographic remarks. They are intellectual problems, 
paradigmatic concerns, and they are treated with a bird’s-eye-view approach. 
 Myth-minded age primitivism, development, evolution, progression, control of 
Society over Nature, and control of ruling class over peasantry – these ideas participate 
in a wider intellectual discussion that leaves the locality of ethnographic perusal. 
Involving theories of Weber (Traditionalism  Rationality), Spencer (Regimentation  
Laissez-Faire), Comte (Religion  Science), Marx (Feudalism  Capitalism), and others, 
both of these authors engage with huge debates spanning hundreds of years with 
thousands upon thousands of voices. The audaciousness of both – Lévi-Strauss’s 
shameless insistence upon the ‘immense pride’ of Man’s mastery, and Jonah’s 
assumption of progress as a good thing for peasantry – situates them above what they 
are talking about, with an assertive intellectualism that is detached, contemplative, and 
anchored in matters of mind. The ageing, dynamic author and the author of 
ethnographic recitation and observation are disregarded here for the armchair author. 
 
(d). REFORMIST CRITIQUE 
i. DISILLUSIONMENT 
 
 The last authorial register conveys a sense of pathos and integral human 
connection, whereby we can sympathise with the authors’ passions and emotions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I visited Goiania in 1937. Among endless 
flatlands […] brand-new houses could be 
seen at the four corners of the horizon. 
The biggest of these was a hotel, a 
square box of cement, with the look of 
an air terminus or a miniature fort; one 
might have called it the ‘bastion of 
civilization’ in a literal, and, therefore, a 
strangely ironical sense. For nothing 
could be more barbarous, more 
essentially inhuman, than this way of 
grabbing at the desert. (Lévi-Strauss 
129-130) 
We watched the Laboratory’s 
receptionist turn on the many education 
exhibits that lined the foyer’s walls. […] 
At her crisp touch, lights twinkled, 
wheels turned, flasks bubbled, bells 
rang. “Magic,” declared Miss Pefko. “I’m 
sorry to hear a member of the 
Laboratory family using that brackish, 
medieval word,” said Dr. Breed. “They’re 
the very antithesis of magic.” “You 
couldn’t prove it to me.” (Vonnegut 36) 
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Here, we encounter two very different selections, expressed for a very similar 
purpose: to evoke an all-too-human sense of disillusionment. 
 For Lévi-Strauss, this charged selection displays a lament of cultural cultivation. 
Goiania, a modernist enterprise summed up in ‘a square box of cement,’ with the 
humanity of an ‘air terminus’ and the compassion of a ‘miniature fort,’ is the opposite of 
the cultural richness that his work is about. Frustrated with this cookie-cutter 
modernisation, this bastardisation of human life, he cries out against this 
encroachment: ‘Campers, camp in Parana! Or rather – don’t keep your greasy papers, 
your empty beer-bottles, and your discarded tins for Europe’s last-remaining sites’ 
(133). 
 Vonnegut, on the other hand, deploys a twofold sense of disillusionment of 
science, by being subjected to a show of twinkling lights, moving gears, bubbling flasks, 
and ringing bells. First, to onlookers, these trinkets don’t explain anything. Indeed, the 
audience becomes further mystified by the ‘magic’ of the performance. Second, to 
scientists, these trinkets cannot summarize the consequences of scientific activity. 
Instead of resolving confusions and providing concrete ways forward, the scene 
suggests that science is not a final answer. In a sympathetic register, upset with the 
disillusionment of both scientists and onlookers, Vonnegut reaches out to the reader to 
shake us out of knowing the world of science merely as merely ‘magic’ or toys. This 
register – not the worldly author, not the ethnographic author, not the strictly 
philosophical author – provides a reformist critique, which speaks not to itself, not to 
informants, not to intellectuals, but to us – readers – as human beings. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 What do we have, then? We have the travel book, with an establishment of the 
author as immediate, personal, mobile, developing, characterised by ethnicity, 
citizenship, mortality, and obligatory subjugation. We have the ethnography, with a 
suddenly static, objectified external observer’s claim to knowledge. We have the 
philosophical treatise, a movement from action to armchair, where the author takes a 
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bird’s-eye-view away from the temporality, away from the field, and away from his 
subjectivity. Finally, we have the reformist critique, with the use of pathos to express an 
authorial passion through reflection on the human consequences of actions, making 
philosophy personal and re-establishing the author as a subjective being, preoccupied 
by bookish concerns. 
 These four registers are undoubtedly contradictory, competing, and irresolvable. 
The difficulties of relating life to text in the composition of both ethnography and the 
novel, are expressed in this writing strategy of multiple authorial registers. It is through 
the multi-dimensionality of what is presented that we, as readers, convey agency to an 
author-function to ‘voice’ these registers from one holistic position: a figure at once in 
command yet subjugated to forces beyond control; a figure at once totally subjective 
and completely uninvolved; a figure at once of cool recitation and fevered contestation. 
 Coordinated by the reader, these elements sync and we find that both 
ethnography and the novel are proclivities towards this type of textual organisation. We 
read ethnography and the novel in the same way, and they are strategised, likewise, in 
the same way. It is in this manner that neither is furnished with a ‘stop clause,’ and 
neither is ever sealed with final meaning. Because the coordination of registers, and the 
invention of the author-function come from the very physical act of reading over a text, 
readers will indefinitely maintain these texts in a state that is open and unreduced. A 
disposition that is, truly, counter-theological. 
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